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ABSTRACT
Thispaper presents estimates ofthe average cost of the workers'
compensation insurance program for ahomogeneous group of employers by state.
These estimates are of interest becausethey reflect the operation, direct
nominal costs, and efficiency of workers'compensation.The paper estimates
cost equations for a variety ofalternative specifications.The main finding
is that when cost equations areestimated by ordinary least squares there is a
unit elasticity of costs with respect tobenefits, but instrumental variable
estimates of the effect of benefits yield agreater than unit elasticity.The
results also indicate that the presenceof a state insurance fund is
associated with higher average costs toemployers, all else equal.Finally,
we explore the impact that theminimum standards recommended by theNational
Commission on State Workmen's CompensationLaws would have on workers'
compensation costs.
Alan 8. Krueger John F. Burton, Jr.
Department of Economics New York State School of
and Woodrow Wilson School Industrial & Labor Relations
Princeton, NJ 08544 CornellUniversity
Ithaca, NY 15851I.Introduction
Workerscompensation insurance is the primary program that provides cash
benefits, niedical care, and rehabilitation services to workers who are
disabled by work-related injuries and illnesses.The program is larger than
unemployment insurance, AFDC, and food stamps, as measured by total
expenditures (Bixby, 1989).The provisions of workers' compensation
insurance, such as coverage and benefit levels, are determined exclusively by
the states, which distinguishes workers' compensation frotu most other social
insurance programs in the United States.Also, in contrast to most other
social insurance programs, the insurance arrangements in workers' compensation
include a mixture of private insurance carriers, state insurance funds, and
self- insuring employers.
These distinctive attributes of workers' compensation are the basis for
three topics examined in this paper.One topic is the relative cost
efficiency of the various insurance arrangements used to provide benefits.
Specifically, we examine whether the costs of workers' compensation insurance
provided by private insurance carriers in a jurisdiction are affected by the
presence of a competitive state insurance fund.The second topic concerns the
interstate differences in the employers' costs of workers' compensation
insurance.We are interested in the magnitude of these costs in 1983 (the
most recent year with data available for all variables in our study), and in
how they have changed since 1972.In 1972, the National Commission on State
Wor1en's Compensation Laws conditionally supported the enactment of federal
standards for the program as a means of reducing the disparity in costs and
benefits among the states (see National Conimission, 1972, p. 26).We estimate
the effect such standards would have on the level and dispersion in workers'
conpensation insurance costs.2
Finally, we use the interstate variability in state workers' compensation
programs to estimate the relationship between insurance costs and benefits.
This relationship is of interest because in the absence of a behavioral
response to insurance, costs would rise proportionally with benefits, all else
equal.On the other hand, if either employers or employees change their
behavior in response to higher benefits, costs may rise more or less than
proportionally with benefits.
The paper is organized as follows.We present estimates of the
employers' costs of workers' compensation insurance in section II.A simple
model that focuses on benefits as the determinants of these costs is presented
in section III.This model is then expanded to allow for other institutional
factors.In section IV we fit the data on costs to several relevant
variables.The empirical work analyzes an unbalanced panel of 29 states for
which necessary data are available in four years between 1972 and 1983.In
section V we use the estimated reduced form parameters to examine the
potential influence of Federal standards for workers' compensation laws on the
level and dispersion of workers' compensation costs in these 29 states.3
II.Measuring the Employers' Costs of Workers' Compensation
Until recently, workers' compensation insurance has been a highly
regulated line of insurance.The program is primarily financed by insurance
premiums paid by employers; about 20 percent of all benefits are paid directly
by self-insuring employers.1Employers who purchase insurance from private
companies or from state insurance funds are assigned to one or more industrial
or occupational classifications.Most states follow the uniform
classifications prescribed by the National Council on Compensation Insurance
(MCCI), or use a roughly comparable classification system.As the basis for
our estimates, we have selected 45 widely used insurance classificationsthat
accounted for 62% of all payroll for employers who purchased workers'
compensation insurancenationally.2Twelve oftheselected classifications
are manufacturing industries, seven are contracting industries (e.g., concrete
work), and the remainder are primarily service and sales industries.
After each of the employer's operations is assigned to a particular
insurance classification, an initial insurance rate called the manual rate is
located in the state's schedule.Manual rates are stated as a certain number
of dollars per $100 of weekly earnings for eachemployee.3As of 1983,
1The ultimate incidence of workers' compensation costs may differ from
the party that nominally finances the program.We return to this issue in
section V.
2This estimate of the extent of payroll covered by the selected
classifications is based on data for 36 states which report such information
to the NCCI.By 1983, two of the rate classifications were merged, leaving us
with 44 insurance classifications.Strictly speaking, our subsequent
econometric estimates only apply to these selected insurance classifications.
3ourstatisticalanalysis involves the 29 states listed in Table 2.In
Utah, workers' compensation premiums are assessed against the full overtime
premium, while in the other 28 states in this study, hours of overtime work
are valued at the regular hourly wage.Since the overtime premium is a modest
portion of payroll, manual rates in Utah were not adjusted for interstate
differences in payroll bases.See Burton and Krueger (1986), pp. 130-131.forty-six states and the District of Columbia had rating systems that could be
compared for the 45 insurance classifications that we examine.For each of
these jurisdictions, we calculate a weighted average manual rate for the 45
insurance classifications, using the distribution of national payroll among
these classifications as the weights.
Most employers, however, do not pay insurance premiums that are solely a
product of their payroll times the manual rate for their insurance
classification.Insurance premiums are often adjusted to an employer's own
accident experience (i.e., experience-rating), premium discounts for quantity
purchases, and dividends received from mutual companies or participating stock
companies.4In addition, by 1983 most states allowed carriers to deviate from
the manual rates after obtaining the insurance commissioner's approval, and
six states allowed "open competition" among insurance carriers.Using an
approach described in detail in Burton and Krueger (1986), we adjust the
manual premiums to reflect these factors.5The first four columns of Table 1
report weighted averages of manual rates adjusted for experience-rating,
premium dicounts, deviations, open competition, and dividends.
The estimates of "adjusted manual rates" in Table 1 can be interpreted as
the percent of payroll expended on workers' compensation by a homogeneous
most of the years we study, data are not available to make state
specific adjustments for experience-rating or dividend payments.Since most
states use a uniform experience-rating formula we use the national average
experience-rating and dividend offset in these states.We use state specific
data for states that substantially deviate from the norm.See Burton and
Krueger (1986).
5The costmeasures for the states that allow open competition are
adjusted to reflect more recent state-level information on the impact of open
competition.The adjusted manual rates for the six states with open
competition in effect as of January 21, 1983 are the manual rates shown in
Table 3 of Burton and Krueger (1986) times the estimated net impact of open
competition shown in Table 7-12 of Hunt, Krueger and Burton (1988)Table 1: Industry Weighted Averages of Net Costs
and Adjusted Manual Rates by State
Adjusted Manual Rates Net Costs
Jurisdiction 1972 1975 1978 1983 1972 1975 1978 1983
Alabama .479 .599 .855 .905 .611 .938 1.544 2.565
Alaska .832 1.721 1.762 2.162 1.627 4.127 4.87910.061
Arizona 1.385 2.178 2.505 1.273 2.066 3.985 5.293 3.733
Arkansas .915 1.038 1.292 1.178 1.040 1.447 2.078 2.860
California 1.102 1.406 2.135 2.103 1.755 2.746 4.816 6.826
Colorado .649 .654 1.210 1.094 .968 1.196 2.554 3.368
Connecticut .697 .827 1.353 1.786 1.008 1.467 2.7685.160
Delaware .578 .736 1.428 1.184 .835 1.3042.922 3.354
DC .737 1.404 3.502 2.208 1.219 2.847 8.199 7.717
Florida NA NA 2.641 1.396 NA NA 4.793 3.606
Georgia .501 .760 1.077 .907 .629 1.169 1.912 2.360
Hawaii .960 1.335 2.057 3.793 1.306 2.229 3.96411.156
Idaho .865 1.283 1.287 1.291 1.063 1.933 2.238 3.727
Illinois .657 1.002 1.382 1.046 1.029 1.925 3.0633.316
Indiana .385 .417 .480 .337 .576 .766 1.016 1.062
Iowa .451 .662 1.084 .947 .644 1.159 2.1902.966
Kansas .575 .766 .879 .813 .767 1.253 1.659 2.303
Kentucky .668 1.065 1.382 1.120 .949 1.856 2.781 3.442
Louisiana NA NA 1.512 1.339 NA NA 2.909 3.964
Maine .520 .981 1.380 1.636 .687 1.588 2.581 4.495
Maryland .816 1.009 1.262 1.909 1.154 1.750 2.5265.520
Massachusetts 1.106 1.171 1.373 1.526 1.569 2.037 2.7574.270
Michigan .914 1.238 1.890 1.458 1.493 2.480 4.372 4.899
Minnesota .854 1.240 1.821 1.411 1.237 2.203 3.7334.151
Mississippi .751 .902 .902 .825 .856 1.261 1.457 1.997
Missouri NA NA .740 .598 NA NA 1.196 1.763
Montana .948 1.565 1.404 1.589 1.330 2.695 2.7954.993
Nebraska .529 .789 .710 .793 .782 1.430 1.4842.303
New Hampshire .534 .746 1.166 1.351 .689 1.179 2.1283.514
New Jersey 1.224 1.233 1.687 1.422 1.872 2.312 3.651 4.357
New Mexico .787 1.069 1.441 1.967 .957 1.594 2.4795.279
New York .864 .973 1.770 1.184 1.326 1.8303.8443.679
North Carolina .420 .433 .532 .733 .501 .634 .899 1.823
Ohio .885 1.109 1.550 1.375 1.352 2.077 3.3524.355
Oklahoma NA 1.052 1.446 1.386 NA 1.673 2.6543.916
Oregon 1.491 2.074 2.918 1.219 2.269 3.872 6.2883.789
Pennsylvania .387 .776 1.173 1.395 .554 1.365 2.3824.146
Rhode Island .767 .899 1.303 1.444 .993 1.427 2.387 3.648
South Carolina .609 .590 .836 .942 .700 .832 1.360 2.320
South Dakota .511 .635 .842 .736 .706 1.077 1.649 2.194
Tennessee .664 .710 .903 .767 .866 1.134 1.666 2.111
Texas NA NA 1.753 1.644 NA NA 3.293 4.747
Utah .503 .766 .892 .724 .678 1.267 1.701 2.116
Vermont .514 .588 .875 .729 .684 .963 1.646 1.975
Virginia .391 .539 .880 1.044 .478 .808 1.525 2.726
West Virginia .428 .671 .660 1.162 .563 1.069 1.229 3.507
Wisconsin .505 .581 .752 .791 .751 1.060 1.582 2.480
Mean .723 .981 1.376 1.290 1.027 1.7202.770 3.843
Std. Dcv. .267 .398 .621 .567 .439 .839 1.465 1.9565
sample of employers.The results indicate, for example, that as of January 1,
1983the 45 types of employers spent, on average,.905 percent of payroll on
workers' compensation premiums in Alabama.The mean cost among all 47 states
in that year was 1.290 percent of payroll.
It is also useful to examine the dollar amount of workers' compensation
weekly premiums paid per employee.To compare such figures across states, it
is necessary to control for differences in the average wage that stem from the
state's industrial mix.6Consequently, we calculate a weighted average of
each state's wage using the individual state's industry wage distribution and
the national industry employment distribution.The last four columns in Table
1 present estimates of the "net cost" of workers' compensation insurance,
which equals the adjusted manual rate times the "industry-adjusted" state
average wage.These figures are in nominal dollars.The table indicates, for
example, that the 45 types of employers spent, on average, $2.565 per week per
employee on workers' compensation premiums in Alabama in 1983.
III.A Model of Insurance Costs
A simple model of the determination of workers' compensation costs is
presented to guide the empirical work,'We assume that all workers have a
probabilitypof incurring a work-related injury that will result in a
workers' compensation benefit ofBdollars.If the average workers'
compensation insurance costs per worker is denoted C, then expected profit
for the insurer per covered worker (if)is if— (l-p)C+p(C-B)
6This adjustment is necessary because the numerator --costsper employee
--isstandardized for industrial composition.
7We note that Butler and Worrall (1988) develop a more extensive model
that allows for variations in the duration of work-related injuries as well.If insurance rates are actuarially fair the average workers' compensation
cost per worker isC —p8.It is more realistic, however, to allow for a
loading factor that is proportional to workers' compensation rates to cover
administrative costs.In this situation,C —C+p8,where is the
proportional loading factor that is built into workers' compensation rates.
The average cost of workers' compensation insurance to employers, therefore,
isC —p8/(l-).Taking the natural log of costs gives
(1) log(C) —- log(l-)+log(p)+log(B)
So far we have assumed that the probability of a work-related injury is
exogenous.If an employee's probability of receiving workers' compensation
benefits depends positively (or negatively) on the benefit rate because of
reasons discussed below, then insurance costs would rise more(or less) than
proportionally with benefits.In particular, if the functional form relating
the compensated claims rate and the benefit level is p—AB then
(2)log(C) —a+(1+-y)log(8)
where -yis the elasticity of workers' compensation recipiency with respect to
average benefits, and a —log(A/(l-)]is a constant.8
This model predicts a log-log relationship between costs and benefits.
If the coefficient on the benefit variable in equation (2) is greater than
one, there is support for the view that employees respond to increased
workers' compensation benefits by increasing the number of claims they
constant elasticity specification is estimated in most of the previous
empirical research on the benefit-claims relationship.See Butler and Worrall
(1983), Butler (1983), and Krueger (1988).These papers also provide a
choice-theoretic model of work injuries.7
successfully file.This increase in claims could come about either through a
moral hazard effect, in which workers take less care on the job and incur more
work injuries in response to increased income security (the "true injury
effect"), or through an incentive to report claims for injuries that would not
have been reported in the absence of a sufficient monetary incentive (the
'reporting effect"), or a combination of both effects.
A finding that the coefficient on benefits is less than one would support
the conclusion that increased workers' compensation benefits lead to a
safer work environment, perhaps because experience rating causes higher
benefits to enhance the incentive for employers to provide safe working
conditions.Alternatively, a negative estimate ofmay reflect employer or
carrier decisions to more aggressively oppose claims in response to higher
benefits.Finally, if the coefficient on benefits equals one, there is
evidence that on net workers' compensation benefits have no effect on the
number of claims.This could come about because the various effects
described above are either offsetting or insignificant.Most previous
studies, such as Chelius (1977) and Butler and Worrall (1983), have found a
positive relationship between benefits and costs, which has been interpreted
as evidence of a moral hazardeffect.9
If the frequency of on-the-job injuries is not affected by the workers'
compensation benefit level, it is necessary to control for the injury rate as
shown in equation (1) for two reasons.First, a high injury rate may lead to
political pressure for high benefits, which would bias the estimate of y
9See Kniesner and Leeth (1989) foran analysis of the relative importance
of moral hazard and reporting effects. Ehrenberg (1988) discusses the
difficulty in distinguishing among the various possible consequences of higher
workers' compensation benefits on reported workplace injuries.8
unless the injury rate is included in the equation; and second, even if the
injury rate and benefit level are uncorrelated, including the injury rate will
improve the precision of the estimates.On the other hand, if higher benefits
cause more (or fewer) workers' compensation claims, one should exclude the
injury rate from the equation to allow its effect to load on the benefit
variable.Since it is not clear pprioriwhich assumption is correct, we take
an eclectic approach and estimate each equation with and without the injury
rate.The work injury rate (p)is derived from the annual OS}{A survey of all




It is desirable to control for other relevant institutional and economic
variables that influence workers' compensation costs in a state.We estimate
the simple model in equation (2), and estimate models that include explanatory
variables measuring medical benefits, the presence of a competitive state
insurance fund, the proportion of the sate's workforce that is unionized, the
extent of coverage under the state workers' compensation law, and the
proportion of cases accounted for by permanent partial disabilities.
The insurance arrangements that deliver workers' compensation benefits
differ from state to state, with variation in the importance of private
carriers, competitive or exclusive state funds, and self-insurance.It is
widely believed that these types of insurance arrangements influence the costs
of workers' compensation.The workers' compensation program is unique among
10Although the workers' compensation claims ratemay be a preferable
measure of pit is not available by state in the early years of our sample.9
social insurance programs in the extent of private sector involvement in the
enforcement of the program, collection of premiums, and delivery of benefits,
and thus offers an unusual opportunity to study the relative efficiency of
private versus public provision of social insurance.
Although the debate over the proper insurance delivery system ranges over
several issues, this study can only estimate the relative cost to employers of
insurance purchased in states that allow private sector insurance companies to
compete against the state insurance fund.11Differences in services, tax
liabilities, reserving practices, and reporting requirements that vary among
the insurance schemes are not directly accounted for by the model,
One hypothesis is that the presence of a state insurance fund will be
associated with higher insurance costs to employers because a state
bureaucracy will be inefficient and have some monopoly power.An alternative
view, however, is that state-fund insurance is less costly than private
insurance because state-operated funds benefit from economies of scale and
tax-exempt status, and the absence of a profit motive leads to smaller loading
factorsJ2We include a dummy variable indicating the presence of a state
fund in our equation to test these hypotheses.
11Because benefit dataare unavailable for states with an exclusive state
fund, these states are not included in the sample.In addition, we do not
consider the importance of self-insurance because all states in our sample
allow large firms to self-insure, and the decision to self-insure is
endogenous.Our conclusions are qualitatively unchanged, however, when we
include a polynomial in -the proportion of losses due to self-insured firms in
the equations below (this variable is reported in Price, 1986).Butler and
Worrall (1983) included a polynomial in the proportion of payroll in nonseif-
insuring firms to control for selection into the sample.
12Millis and Montgomery (1938) and Somers and Somers (1954) provide early
discussions of these hypotheses.See Butler and Worrall (1986) for a more
recent theoretical and empirical analysis of the returns to scale, efficiency,
and hidden costs of public versus private workers' compensation insurance.10
Another factor expected to influence the cost of workers' compensation to
employers is the extent of unionization.Butler and Worrall (1983) find a
positive and statistically significant relationship between unionization and
workers' compensation claims.If unions play a critical role providing
"voice" in the work-place, this finding is to be expected since unionized
workers would be better informed about and more likely to exercise their
rights under workers' compensation laws than nonunionized workers.
Alternatively, the union rate may be positively related to the injury rate
because unions find it easier to organize more dangerous work-places, all else
equal.We expect that among the states the proportion of workers unionized
will be positively associated with workers' compensation costs.
The fraction of the states workforce covered by workers' compensation
legislation is expected to be related to the employers' costs of insurance.
If employees in exempt occupations are at greater risk of work-related
disabilities than employees in covered occupations, a greater proportion of
covered workers in a state is expected to be associated with greater workers'
compensation costs.The opposite result would imply that exempt occupations
are safer than covered occupations.
Permanent partial disability benefits are paid to workers with relatively
serious injuries, so that losses of actual earnings or of earning capacity
continue even after maximum medical recovery.The statutes and practices used
to compensate and classify these cases vary widely among the states.We
control for this institutional feature by including a variable measuring
permanent partial disability cases as a proportion of all cases.Since
permanent partial cases account for a disproportionate share of workers
compensation benefit payments, we expect a positive relationship between the11
relative importance of permanent partial cases and insurance costs.We also
expect that higher medical benefits will increase the cost of workers'
compensation insurance.
IV.Data and Results
We fit the workers' compensation costs presented in section II to the
institutional and economic variables indicated in the above discussion.Table
2 presents sunimary statistics and describes the variables.Data are available
for 29 states for the years 1972, 1975, 1978 and 1983.Unfortunately,
complete data are unavailable for all these states in all years, so the final
sample consists of 108 observations.
Because of its importance for the estimation and the policy analysis, we
describe the indemnity benefit variable in detail.There are four principal
types of workers' compensation indemnity benefits--temporarytotal,
permanent total, permanent partial, and survivors'benefitsJ3Conditional on
filing a successful claim, the expected workers' compensation benefit is
determined by the weekly benefit and the discounted duration over which
benefits are paid.
The weekly workers' compensation benefit is determined by the nominal
replacement rate, the maximum weekly benefit, the minimum weekly benefit, and
the weekly wage of the disabled worker.Unless a worker's benefit exceeds the
maximum benefit or is less than the minimum benefit, the benefit equals the
weekly wage times the replacement rate.The distribution of benefits is
doubly censored because workers in the lower tail of the earnings distribution
131nmany states there are also temporary partial indemnity benefits, but
these benefits account for a relatively insignificant share of total workers'
compensation payments and are not considered further.Table 2:Description of Variables
Mean
Variable (SD) Definition and Source
Net Costs 3.04 Employment weighted average of weekly
(1.70) workers' compensation insurance premiums
per employee in 1983 dollars, allowing
for experience rating and dividends.
Source: calculated by authors.
Adjusted Manual 1.00 Net insurance costs per $100 of payroll.
Rates (.54) Source: calculated by authors.
Benefit 149.44 Average insurance benefit paid for
(33.87) temporary total, permanent total, permanent
partial, and fatal workers' compensation
cases adjusted for the duration of benefits
and waiting and retroactive periods. In 1983
dollars.Source: calculated by authors.
Proportion Perm. .17 Permanent partial cases relative to
Partial Cases (.06) all cases, on a first report basis.
Source: NCCI Countrywide Statistics.
Injury RaCe .09 All work-related injuries and illnesses per
(.02) full-time equivalent employee, weighted by
national industry employment. Source:
unpublished tabulations based on OSHA5
survey of private sector employers.
Medical Benefit 85.30 Average medical benefit paid in
Index (23.18) temporary total workers' compensation
cases divided by 100.Source: NCCI
Countrywide Statistics.
Coverage Rate .83 Proportion of non-agricultural workers
(.07) covered by state workers' compensation
laws.Source: Daniel Price, Social
Security Bulletin, May 1983.
Union Rate .23 Proportion of non-agricultural workers who
(.07) are union members.Source: Bureau of
National Affairs and Handbook of Labor
Statistics.
State Insurance .25 Dunmiy variable for states with a competitive
(.44) state insurance fund.Source: Daniel
Price, Social Security u11etin, May 1983.
Note: Sample size is 108.The states in the sample are: Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin.12
are paid the minimum benefit and workers in the upper tail are paid the -
maximumbenefit.To estimate the expected weekly benefit from the statutory
provisions, we calculate the mean of the censored benefit distribution for
14
each state.
Many states impose limits on the duration of benefit payments or on the
total dollar amount of benefits.We apply the NCCI's commutation procedures
to discount weekly permanent total and fatal benefits durations for interest,
mortality, dollar amount limitations, and escalation of benefits where
applicable.The duration index times the expected weekly benefit yields an
estimate of the total expected benefit package for the disability class.In
addition, we adjust temporary totaUbenefits to reflect the length of the
waiting period which is required before benefits begin, and the length of the
retroactive period upon which compensation is paid for the waiting period.
Estimates of scheduled and nonscheduled permanent partial benefits for
1972 to 1978 were provided by Butler and Worrall and updated by the authorsJ5
These permanent partial benefits calculations take into account the weekly
benefit levels as well as the number of weeks for which benefits are payable.
For our purposes, the scheduled and nonscheduled benefits were weighted by the
relative frequency of those types of injuries in each state and collapsed into
an overall permanent partial benefit.
14The distribution of earnings that we use to calculate expected benefits
is the national wage distribution centered on each state's average weekly
wage.This procedure follows the NCCI's methodology.
15The statutes inmost states contain a schedule that lists the number of
weeks or dollar amounts of benefits paid for the physical loss or the loss of
use of specified parts of the body.A scheduled benefit involves any injury
specifically enumerated in the statute.Nonscheduled benefits involve
injuries that are not included in the statutory list.See Berkowitz and
Burton (1987, p. 99).13
Because of ulticollinearity, it is not sensible to include separate
variables for temporary total, permanent total, permanent partial, and fatal
benefits.We therefore combined the four benefit variables into one overall
benefit measure by weighting each typeofbenefit by its national claims
frequency.This approach to estimating workers' compensation benefits is
particularly useful for our purposes because we can impose the National
Comnission's proposed minimumstandardson each state law and actuarially
simulate the effect of federal minimumstandardson benefits.
Results
Table 3 presents reduced form least squares regression estimates of cost
equations using the log of adjusted manual rates as the dependent variable and
allowing for a variety of different independent variables.Table 4 contains
parallel results using the log of net costs as the dependent variable.16The
equations are estimated on an unbalanced panel of states from 1972 to1983.17
In some specifications we exploit the longitudinal nature of the data and
estimate within state (or fixed effects) regressions to control for time-
invariant state effects, such as the efficiency of the state administrative
18 agency.
16The log-log specification for costs and benefits seems appropriate for
three reasons: first, estimation of the Box-Cox transformation finds that the
best fit is approximately log-log; second, a plot of the data reveals a
nonlinear, increasing relationship between costs and benefits; and third, the
model in section III predicts a log-log relationship between costs and benefits.
17We donot include separate year dummies because we want the common
time-series variation in benefits to identify the equations.A Chow test of
structural change does not reject the hypothesis that the determinants of
workers' compensation costs are stable over the years examined at the01
level for all of the specifications presented in Tables 3 and 4.
18Sinceour sample consists of observations on states that vary greatly
in size, there is reason to suspect conditional heteroscedasticity.We
therefore performed a series of Breusch-Pagan (1979) tests by regressing theTable 3:The Determinants of Workers' Compensation Insurance














































































28 State Dummies No No No No yes'1 y5C
AdjustedR2 .278 .278 .399 .397 .780 .777
Notes: a. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
b. Sample size is 108.
c. Mean (SD) of ln(Adjusted Manual Rates) is -.109 (.463).
d. F-test of the hypothesis that the state dummies jointly equal zero
rejects at the .000001 level in columns 5 and 6.Table 4:The Determinants of Workers' Compensation Insurance














































































28 State Dummies No No No No yes'1 y5d
AdjustedR2 .341 .382 .497 .503 .802 .801
Notes: a. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
b. Sample size is 108.
c. Mean (SD) of ln(Net Costs) is.991 (.467).
d. F-test of the hypothesis that the state dummies jointly equal zero
rejects at the .000001 level in columns 5 and 6.14
The results indicate that for either measure of workers' compensation
costs we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is a unit elasticity
between costs and benefits, regardless of the set of included regressors.The
estimated elasticity between benefits and costs is slightly greater than one
if state dummies are omitted from the equation, and slightly less than one if
state dummies are added to the equation.These results imply that for a given
proportional change in indemnity benefits, workers' compensation insurance
costs will rise by the same proportion.This finding does not support the
generally positive relationship between benefits and the number of reported
injuries found in most earlier studies.However, if the state-level benefit
variable is measured with error, the elasticity between benefits and costs
will be biased downward asymptotically, and the attenuation bias will be
greater in the fixed effects models if (as seems likely) the state dummies
absorb more of the signal than noise in the benefit variable.
The possibility of an errors-in-variables problem with the benefit
variable lead us to use the states' maximum benefit, minimum benefit, waiting
period and retroactive period as instruments for the benefit variablej9
These results are reported in Appendix Table Al for models without the injury
rate.Instrumenting for the benefit variable with these proxies in the
adjusted manual rate equations leads the coefficient (standard error) on
squared-residuals of the estimated2equations on the total employment of each
state; the sample size times the Rof these ancillary regressions
asymptotically follows a chi-square distribution with one degree of freedom.
Results of these tests show no evidence of conditional heteroscedasticity.
For instance, the chi-square statistic for the test corresponding to the first
column of Table 1 is only .08.
19These parameters relate totemporary total benefits, which account for
the greatest share of cases.A chi-square test of instrument-error
orthogonality fails to reject when no covariates are in the equation at the
.10 level, but rejects when covariates are included.15
benefits to increase to 1.303 (.186) when there are no covariates, and to
1.087 (.202) when state dummies and covariates are included.Similar results
are found for net costs.Thus, measurement error may indeed bias the estimate
of downward, and instrumenting for benefits brings our estimates closer to
the previous literature.Nonetheless, the estimate ofeven after correcting
for measurement error is not statistically significantly different from zero
in the fixed effects specification.
One explanation for the smaller point estimates of the net injury
response to higher benefits in our analysis than in the previous literature is
that the additional claims that result from increased benefits have relatively
low costs.Such claims would have little effect on our costs measures, but
would have a larger effect on measures of injuries that treat all claims
equally.
Another key variable is the dummy variable indicating the presence of a
state insurance fund.We find that the presence of a state fund is associated
with nearly a 20 percent increase in average insurance costs, all else equal.
Moreover, this conclusion is unchanged when either measure of costs is the
dependent variable.Since no state added or eliminated a competitive state
insurance fund in the period covered by our sample, we can not estimate the
effect of the state fund once the 28 state dummy variables are included in the
model unless additional covariance restrictions are made.2°
201-iausman and Taylor (1981) show that the effect of a variable that is
constant over time can still be estimated in a fixed effects specification if
one of the included variables is uncorrelated with the time-invariant
component of the error term and correlated with the variable of interest.
Aniemiya and MaCurdy (1986) and Breusch, Mizon, and Schmidt (1989) derive
consistent estimators in this context based on stronger identification
assumptions.In the present application, however, it seems to us that there
is no legitimate covariance restriction to use to identify the effect of a
state fund in the fixed effects specifications.16
As expected, the models that include the log of the injury rate typically
find a positive relationship between reported injuries and the cost of
workers' compensation insurance.The coefficient on the log injury rate is
substantially less than one, however, possibly due to inaccurate reporting of
work injuries to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.When the
coefficient on the injury rate is constrained to equal one, the other
coefficients retain the same sign and are of similar magnitude.
The proportion of cases that are classified as permanent partial
disabilities has the expected positive sign.The variable becomes
statistically insignificant when the state dummies are added, however.
Curiously, we find that the union membership rate has a positive effect on
costs in the regressions without state dummy variables, but has a sizable
negative impact when we include the state dummies.One possible explanation
for this pattern is that in the fixed effects specification the union rate is
identified by within state time-series variation in union membership, and over
this time period the union rate was generally trending down while workers
compensation costs were trending up.The coefficients for the medical benefit
index and the coverage rate are consistently positive and consistently
statistically insignificant.
V.Federal Standards and Workers' Compensation Insurance Costs
The National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Lawsconcluded
that, "State workmen's compensation laws in general are inadequate and
inequitable" (National Commission, 1972, p.119).21The National Commission
21The conclusion that workers' compensation benefits are inadequate is
also supported by empirical work by Viscusi and Moore (1987).17
proposed thst all ststes voluntarily incorporate 19 essential recommendations
into their workers' compensation laws to rectify the inequity and inadequacy
of the program.Moreover, if the states failed to adopt these
recommendations, the Commission endorsed the passage of federal minimum
standards to encourage compliance with its recommendations.The justificatior
for federal standards offered by the National Commission was that their
enactment "will remove from each State the main barrier to effective workmen's
compensation reform: the fear that compensation costs may drive employers to
move away to markets where protection for disabled workers is inadequate but
less expensive" (National Commission, 1972, p.27).
Several objections can be offered to this justification.Perhaps most
important, higher benefits in a state could be offset by lower wages, and
therefore employers in high benefit states would not be at a competitive
disadvantage.However, while there is evidence of a trade-off between-
benefits and wages, the results are not compelling that benefit increases are
fully offset by lower wages (see Ruser, 1985, Viscusi and Moore, 1987, and
Hamermesh and Wolfe, 1989) .Employerscertainly act as if they will bear the
burden of higher benefits, and they effectively lobby many legislators
22
(National Commission, 1972, p.125).
We will not attempt to resolve the issue of the incidence of workers'
compensation costs in this paper.There is another argument against federal
standards, however, that we will address.The implicit assumption underlying
the National Commission's assertion that federal standards will reduce
interstate differences in costs is that states with low benefits have low
220n September 22, 1987, for instance, the Wall Street Journal (p.1)
reported that, "Wide differences in [workers' compensation] benefits from
state to state . ..drawcorporate fire."18
costs, and therefore forcing these states to improve benefits will decrease
dispersion in costs.If, however, low benefit states already have relatively
high costs, then federal standards will only increase the dispersion in costs
among states and thus defeat the basic rationale for standards.
We use the estimated elasticity of costs with respect to benefits to
simulate the impact that proposed national standards for workers' compensation
benefits would have on the level and dispersion in employers' direct costs of
workers' compensation insurance.Specifically, we focus on the eight
essential recommendations that directly affect indemnity benefits.These
recommendations require the maximum benefit to be at least 100 percent of the
state average weekly wage for temporary total, permanent total, and fatal
cases, and require a replacement rate of at least two-thirds the gross weekly
wage for these cases.In addition, the recommendations require temporary
total, permanent total, and fatal benefits to be paid for the duration of the
disability, or for life, without any limitations on the total dollar amount.
The actuarial methods described in section III were used to estimate the
expected, discounted value of benefits for a successful claim in each state
assuming that the essential benefit recommendations were fully adopted and
enforced.State laws that did not meet the standards were brought up to the
level of the National Commission's recommendations, while provisions that
already met or exceeded the minimum standards were not altered.23Our
estimates predict that in 1972 workers' compensation benefits would have been
36 percent greater than actual costs on average in the 29 states if the eight
231n accordance with compliance evaluation criteria established in ll
ComDlianceof State Laws with Workers' Comøensation Recommended Standards
(Washington, DC, 1976) maximum weekly benefits were set at the average weekly
wage of workers covered by the unemployment insurance program two years prior
to the year considered.19
essential benefit recommendation were incorporated into each state law.By
1983, compliance with the benefit recommendations would have increased
benefits by an average of 14 percent.
Our approach to estimating the effect of compliance with minimum
standards on insurance costs is based on the equations estimated in Tables 3
and 4:
(3) log(C) —X1l + 2 log(B.)
+c.
where X.is a vector of independent variables, .isthe average benefit leve
in state i,t.is an estimation error, and l and are coefficient vectors
Assuming the parameters and control variables remain constant, the "simulated
log cost of workers' compensation insurance for state Iis
(4)log(C) —Xl + 2 log(S)+Li
where is the "simulated" average cost, is the expected benefit in state
i under full compliance with the minimum standards, and all other variables
and parameters are defined as before.
The difference between the log of workers' compensation costs assuming




Intuitively, this equation makes sense because if benefits are unchanged by
national standards, there is no change in costs.Finally, we solve equation
(5) for to obtain:
(6)C. —exp (log(C) + [log() -log(B) J I20
The mean, standard deviation, and coefficient of variation for the
simulated and actual costs based on equation (6) are presented in Table 5.
The simulated costs were estimated under two extreme assumptions: first, using
the elasticity estimated in the most parsimonious model (model 1 of
Tables 3 and 4); second, using the elasticity estimated in the within state
analysis (model 6 of Tables 3 and 4).
As to be expected, the simulation results indicate that the direct cost
of workers' compensation insurance to employers would have increased in our
sample if the National Commission's recommendations were adopted.The
evidence regarding the effect of national standards on the dispersion in costs
across states, however, is mixed.In the 1970s the simulations suggest that
national standards would have increased the standard deviation in workers
compensation costs, while in 1983 the standard deviation would have been
reduced.Furthermore, in every year the coefficient of variation is lower
under the assumption that states would have complied with the National
Commission's proposed minimum standards.Since adjusted manual rates and net
costs have an approximately log normal distribution, the coefficient of
variation may be the most appropriate measure of dispersion in this situation.
Several caveats are in order regarding the robustness of the simulated
costs.First, the volume of litigation may initially increase following
enactment of federal minimum standards due to the uncertainty that accompanies
changes in the law.And second, the parameters and structure of the models
may change if national minimum standards are actually established.As a
result, we take the simulated costs as a rough indication of the consequences
of federal standards rather than a precise estimate.Table 5:Simulation for National Standards and Actual Workers'









Actual .699 .270 .386
1972 Model1 .971 .343 .353
Model6 .932 .329 .353
Actual .935 .436 .466
1975 Model1 1.078 .456 .423
Model6 1.059 .451 .426
Actual 1.232 .560 .455
1978 Model1 1.322 .579 .438
Model6 1.310 .574 .438
Actual 1.194 .621 .520
1983 Model1 1.345 .607 .451
Model6 1.325 .608 .459
Actual 1.015 .530 .522
All Model1 1.179 .525 .445
Model6 1.157 .524 .453









Actual 2.287 1.001 .438
1972 Model1 3.296 1.282 .389
Model6 2.926 1.157 .395
Actual 2.929 1.534 .524
1975 Model1 3.429 1.606 .468
Model6 3.254 1.563 .480
Actual 3.679 1.919 .522
1978 Model1 3.989 2.013 .505
Model6 3.875 1.966 .507
Actual 3.429 1.865 .544
1983 Model1 3.914 1.818 .464
Model6 3.746 1.831 .489
Actual 3.081 1.688 .548
All Model1 3.655 1.705 .466
Model6 3.450 1.681 .487
a.Sample size is 29 states each year.Estimates for model 1
assume the cost-benefit elasticities estimated in the first column
of Tables 3 and 4, and estimates for model 6 assume the elasticity
estimated in column 6 of Tables 3 and 4.See text for further details.
b.In 1983 dollars.21
VI.Conclusions
The results of our snalysis of workers' compensation costs support three
main conclusions.First, when cost equations are estimated by OLS the
elasticity of workers' compensation costs with respect to benefits is
statistically indistinguishable from one.Instrumental variable estimates of
the cost-benefit elasticity are greater than one, but still smaller than would
be expected based on estimates of the claims-benefit elasticity in the past
literature.One possible explanation for this finding vts-a-vis the previous
research is that higher workers' compensation benefits may induce claims that
are relatively minor and of small cost.If this were the case, the elasticity
of costs with respect to benefits would be less than the elasticity of claims
with respect to benefits.
Second, after controlling for factors such as the benefit level and
injury rateworkers' compensation insurance costs are higher in states that
have state-operated insurance funds competing with private carriers than in
states with only private insurance carriers.There are several possible
explanations for this finding, including the possible inefficiency associated
with a state bureaucracy, and omitted variables that are correlated with the
presence of state insurance funds and workers' compensation costs.Clearly,
the sources of this relationship should be examined further before policy
actions are taken.
Finallyour simulations indicate that the federal minimum standards
proposed by the National Conunission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws would
increase the average costs of workers' compensation insurance and decrease the
coefficient of variation among the states in all time periods.The impact of
the minimum standards on the standard deviation of costs is mixed; for 198322
and for the four years combined the standard deviation for either cost measure
would be decreased by the standards, but in the three other years studied the
standard deviation would increase.As a result, the success or failure of the
national Commission's prescription to narrow the dispersion in workers'
compensation costs among the states by requiring minimum federal standards
appears dependent on the time period of interest and the measure of dispersion
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5.72 13.61 9.86 5.38 11.23 11.61
Notes:
a. Excluded instruments for the benefit variable are log of the maximum
benefit, log of the minimum benefit, waiting period, and retroactive period.
b. Sample size is 108.Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
c. Mean (SD) of ln(Net Costs) is .991 (.467).
d. F-test of the hypothesis that the state dummies jointly equal zero rejects
at the .000001 level in columns S and 6.REFERENCES
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